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We argue that support for free speech including 
the one in virtual space of the internet has to 
go hand-in-hand with support for political 
movements who use these tools. 
The use of the internet by protest movements 
should be seen in the context of the growing 
influence of digital technologies for political 
mobilization. High-profile examples include the 
recent political campaigns of Howard Dean 
and Barack Obama in the United States, or the 
global effect of WikiLeaks on politics.
 In each of these cases, the transformational 
capacity of digital communication technology 
is due to its potential for cheap and easily 
scaling connections and the dissemination of 
information. The mass use of digital technologies 
for protest movement coordination goes back to 
at least the turn of the century and the N30 
anti-globalization protests in Seattle, where 
e-mail lists played a key role. Since then, we 
have seen new media employed all around the 
world. Prominent examples include the 2001 
protests in the Philippines, which brought down 
IntroductIon1
As digital media played a crucial role in the 
protests of Arab spring, the events soon came 
to be labelled as “internet revolutions.” Before 
the uprisings in North Africa, the use of online 
communication in mobilizing for protest  against 
repressive regimes had become a worldwide 
tool of prodemocracy activists. Yet, although 
internet and other digital technologies have been 
an irreplaceable tool for mass mobilization, 
they are by no means the ‘cause’ of the revolt 
nor its driving force. 
This policy brief includes two case studies 
– Egypt and Belarus – that show how digital 
communication technologies were used in 
recent protest activities in both countries. 
Based on interviews with civil society activists 
and an analysis of the process, it provides 
recommendations to EU policymakers and 
argues for stronger EU endorsement of civic 
freedoms, including an uncensored internet. 
1	 Alek	Tarkowski	is	the	director	of	Centrum	Cyfrowe	Projekt:	
Polska,	a	think	tank	fostering	digital	civic	society	in	Poland	
and	editor	of	this	brief;	Basem	Fathy	is	a	political	and	civic	
rights	activist,	program	officer	at	Freedom	Hose	Office	
in	Cairo	and	author	of	the	case	study	on	Egypt;	Dzianis	
Melyantsou	is	a	Senior	Analyst	at	Belarusian	Institute	for	
Strategic	Studies	and	author	of	the	case	study	on	Belarus.
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debates as a key dimension of democracy, it 
is  important not  to omit support for movements 
who give internet communication its content. 
thE usE oF onlInE tools For 
dEmocracy In Egypt 2
The Internet was introduced to Egypt in 1992 
but its use was limited to governmental and 
official use until 1997. Up to the end of 1990s, 
the use of the internet was restricted to very 
small number of people from specific classes 
or professions. However, by the end of 2000, 
after the Second Palestinian Intifada, activists 
started to use e-mail for spreading news and 
expressing their solidarity with the Palestinian 
Intifada. The outreach of this communication 
was limited and its purpose was not to mobilize 
but mainly to inform. 
The increase in popularity of these new 
communication tools coincided with the 
American invasion of Iraq in 2003. At that 
time, the activists moved from spreading news 
to organizing antiwar protests. At the same 
time, online forums started to become another 
popular tool for spreading and tracking the 
activism. Besides general public forums, 
political activists started to use specific forums 
to discuss and develop their ideas and activities 
creating specific online forums dedicated for the 
opposition’s political discussions. Blogs started 
to be used for the first time, albeit by a very 
small group of bloggers. 
By the end of 2004 and start of 2005, more 
space for reform opened up in Egypt. Many 
commentators see this as a consequence of 
2	 Some	of	the	prominent	activists	that	had	a	very	strong	
share	in	what	happened	in	Egypt	have	been	interviewed,	
in	particular	people	that	utilized	online	tools	to	the	maximum	
for	spreading	and	organizing	their	work	against	the	ruling	
authoritarian	regime.	The	author	has	furthermore	been	
personally	strongly	involved	in	the	political	mobilization	
that	took	place	in	Egypt	during	the	few	years	prior	to	the	
January	revolution.	The	respondents	included:		Ahmed	Maher,	
Co-founder	and	General	Coordinator	of	the	April	6	Youth	
Movement;	Esraa	Abdelfattah,	Co-initiator	of	the	Facebook	
Group	that	called	for	a	General	Strike	in	April	6,	2008;	
Wael	Abbas,	a	prominent	blogger	focusing		cases	of	torture	
by	the	police;	and	Omar	El-Hady,	a	prominent	activist,	
blogger	and	journalist	who		founded	a	great	part	of	the	youth	
opposition	movement	since	2005.
President Joseph Estrada, protests following 
Iran’s presidential elections in 2009, and the so-
called Twitter Revolution in Moldova of 2009. 
In 2011, the Arab spring became a reference 
point for other protest movements – the 
Occupy Wall Street movement has frequently 
declared that it was inspired by North African 
demonstrators. 
In each of these cases, commentators framing 
the protest as an Internet, Twitter or Facebook 
revolution run the risk of exaggerating the role 
played by digital communication technologies. 
The	 	 Smart	 Mob, a concept proposed by 
Howard Rheingold in 2002, suggests that new 
technologies  enable swift assembly of ad-hoc 
groups that mobilize and coordinate significantly 
faster than traditional protest movements. 
In Rheingold’s view, digital communication 
technologies - because of their instantaneous 
character and network scaling effects - provide 
a way to “supercharge” the protest and create 
“digital revolutions”. It is, however, illusionary 
to see such protests as if they were organized 
by a new breed of activists not supported by 
traditional movement structures.
The critics - one of the most vocal of whom 
is Evgeny Morozov, author of the book Net	
Delusion - point out that the potential of digital 
technologies should always be seen in the 
local political, social and cultural contexts, 
which always serve to limit such capacity. First 
of all, successful online mobilization relies on 
traditional protest groups and organizations 
dependent on strong ties built beyond the sphere 
of online communication. Thus, the internet is 
not a miraculous pro-democracy solution, but 
one of many tools available to protesters. The 
critics also point out factors that complicate the 
use of digital communication technologies - for 
example, the counter-revolutionary measures 
taken by the regimes or threats to protesters’ 
privacy.
As we will demonstrate below, digital 
technologies play an important, but not singular 
role in pro-democracy activities. Online activity 
is always preceded by offline organizing, and 
these two aspects of pro-democracy movements, 
the online and the offline, have to be seen as 
intertwined. Thus, although online freedom is 
more and more often framed in international 
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rEcommEndatIons
• European countries should support the use of digital 
tools for pro-democracy activities as one of the key 
forms of EU assistance for pro-democracy and human 
rights activism around the world. This requires including 
appropriate goals and funding provisions in the European 
Development Fund (EDF), the Development Cooperation 
Instrument (DCI), the European Neighbourhood Policy 
Instrument (ENPI) and the European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). 
• The Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
published in May 2011 placed renewed emphasis 
on civil society as a crucial component of democratic 
change and consolidation. The review includes, 
among other things, a commitment to promoting media 
freedom by supporting civil society organizations’ use of 
electronic communications. It is therefore essential that 
the new instruments for democracy assistance which the 
review envisaged, namely the Civil Society Facility and 
European Endowment for Democracy, prioritize such 
assistance in their grant-making programs. The EED and 
CSF would thus complement the existing instruments: 
EDF, DCI, ENPI and EIDHR.
• The blueprint for the European Endowment for 
Democracy should envisage a strong horizontal “digital 
democracy” program which would not only provide 
advice and coordinate EED grant-making activities but 
also monitor on an ongoing basis the uses and abuses 
of online activism in pre-transition, transition and post-
transition regimes. Such a program could gradually 
build an “Online Activism Compedium” – a collection 
of the lessons learned from the use of new technologies 
around the globe. This Compendium could then be used 
by online activists and democracy donors operating in 
different regions of the world.
• The above-mentioned instruments for democracy 
assistance should encourage activities that combine the 
use of digital online tools with traditional forms of civic 
and political organizing, including the use of broadcast 
media and grassroots activism.
• An open internet is essential for democracy to take 
root. Therefore, European countries should support 
the model of an open, uncensored internet and the 
concept of digital freedoms as basic rights. At the same 
time, Europe should oppose any forms of censorship 
or limitations of the free flow of information and 
communication on the internet. Non-democratic regimes 
should be pressured to end internet censorship.
 
• European countries should avoid introducing 
limitations on online freedoms, such as permanent or 
temporary censorship or blocking of access to online 
sites. Such actions will make Europe look as if it is 
applying a double standard in internal and external 
policies and can serve authoritarian regimes as an 
excuse for censoring the internet.
• Activists should be provided with tools that allow them 
to conduct secure, uninterrupted communications and to 
avoid cases of censorship; also tools that make protest 
communication and organization less costly and more 
effective. Such tools are at best created by civil society 
actors: non-governmental organizations, informal groups 
and individuals with the necessary knowledge of digital 
technologies. Funding and support should be provided 
for creating and spreading these tools to activists. 
• Democracy activists should receive funding and 
training related to the use of digital technologies, in 
particular on protecting anonymity and ensuring security 
of communication. Capacity should be built in pro-
democracy organizations and movements for the use of 
information technologies, in particular for creating online 
tools and adapting existing ones. 
• Funding and support should be provided for the 
Web-based activities of pro-democracy groups, as 
these can provide an important capacity for autonomous 
communication and for attracting more supporters. Even 
promoting basic digital literacy should be seen as an 
activity that increases the potential for the pro-democracy 
uses of online tools for broader parts of society. 
• In order to be effective, online activities need to be 
strongly tied to traditional opposition and forms of social 
protest. New, networked groups should build strong links 
with traditional organizations. In particular, journalists 
from the traditional media struggling to free themselves 
from government-imposed constraints should receive 
hands-on training and funding which would develop 
their skills in using new media to enhance freedom of 
expression.
• The support of online activism from abroad will 
never be enough for pro-democratic change if it is not 
in concert with strong and clear political support for 
democracy and freedom from the political actors in the 
international political playground. 
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Western pressure on the Egyptian regime to 
introduce political reforms, which resulted 
in calling for the first presidential elections in 
Egypt’s history. Others see the cause of these 
developments in general mobilization in the 
region after the Palestinian Intifada and the 
invasion of Iraq. These changes also coincided 
with the emergence of the use of online 
platforms as a new tool for activism. The offline 
protests and events were a good opportunity 
for bloggers to spread the use of their new tools 
among those interested in political activism. 
Also, the opposition movement on the ground 
used online tools for spreading information and 
news of its activities.
By the end of 2005, the internet had become a 
popular tool for organizing opposition activities. 
The internet had by that time about 4 million 
users, or 5% of the population. E-mail, emails 
groups, online forums, blogs, and, later, internet 
radio became popular tools among opposition 
groups and they were used for coordination of 
activities. The new tools proved more appealing 
than traditional communication of the opposition 
– a good example is the online radio station 
started by youth activists of the El-Ghad Party, 
which broadcast talk shows, comedy programs 
and music. 
Between 2005 and 2008, Egyptian youth 
became very skillful in using the internet for their 
activism. In 2008, they used Facebook for the 
first time to organize a major nationwide general 
strike in solidarity with Mahalla City workers 
and to protest a sharp rise in commodity prices. 
Through a Facebook group, Egyptian activists 
called for a general strike in April 2008. In 
two weeks since its initiation in March until 
the day of the strike in April 2008 the group 
membership rose to 77,000 people.3 
Late in 2009, after Mohamed Elbaradei, the 
Egyptian former Director of IAEA, expressed 
interest in supporting democracy in Egypt, 
some 250,000 supporters of his views 
gathered on Facebook and started to organize 
3	 In	March	2008,	textile	workers	in	the	city	of	Mahalla	
decided	to	start	a	strike	on	April	6th	in	protest	of	low	
wages.	This	coincided	with	a	wave	of	increasing	prices	of	
commodities	in	Egypt.	Various	opposition	groups	decided	to	
show	solidarity	and	to	call	for	a	general	strike	on	the	same	
day.	Young	Internet	activists	supported	the	strike	by	initiating	a	
Facebook	group	calling	for	a	general	strike,	This	call	spread	
virally	and	supported	the	protests	in	the	streets.
and coordinate their efforts to further spread 
democratic ideas via the internet and on the 
ground as well. Elbaradei’s supporters gathered 
online and then started to meet offline and to 
organize their work on the ground to reach 
those who were not online. They formed groups 
in the different provinces, and held meetings 
and conferences out of the capital and main 
cities, spreading leaflets and booklets to inform 
people about Elbaradei andhis activities.
In mid-2010, a brutal incident occurred in 
Alexandria, a major city in the north of Egypt. 
A young man named Khaled Said had been 
tortured to death in the street by two police 
officers. Afterward, a very broad online wave 
of solidarity broke out with a Facebook page 
of 770,000 members, a figure 10 times larger 
than the Facebook group created in 2008 in 
support of the strike in Mahalla. Similarly, the 
number of activists participating in the protests 
and activities on the ground grew by a factor 
of 10 from about 1,000 in 2008 to 10,000 
in 2010.4 
From 2008 up to the end of 2010, Egyptian 
online activists became proficient in the use 
of online tools. The range of technologies 
widened to include micro-blogging services like 
Twitter, video-sharing platforms like Youtube, 
photo-sharing services like Flicker, tagging 
platforms like Delicious, and Geotagging and 
Crowdsourcing platforms like Ushahidi, as well 
as tens of other applications, platforms, and 
networks. An example of the innovation were the 
tagging platforms, which proved to be a simple 
way to aggregate all the blogs addressing a 
certain topic in one place. Crowdsourcing was 
used frequently, especially to map violations 
and irregularities during the 2010 elections. 
These were the last elections before the 
revolution, and fraud occurring at that time 
was  an important motivation for initiating the 
revolution. Irregularities in the elections were 
documented intensively through social networks 
and mapping tools – and managed to create 
a general sense among internet users and their 
offline networks that the election had been 
rigged. The year 2010 represented the peak of 
the curve in using internet tools in activism, both 
4	 All	the	numbers	are	estimates,	as	no	official	count	was	
made.	These	are	based	on	first-hand	relations	of	participants	
in	these	events.
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in terms of the use of new tools and improved 
skill in their use by activists, and in quantitative 
terms as well, as the number of online networks 
that were calling or working for democracy 
increased in an unprecedented way, with 
numbers of members that was unprecedented 
as well. 
All the activists who had been engaged in 
public mobilization  since 2000 represented a 
wide and loose network that never had been 
organized in a traditional or hierarchical way 
and had never been fully interconnected. At 
some point, this network became focused on 
a single goal, though still without having any 
traditional organizational form. This occurred 
in January 2011, as Egyptian activists 
were inspired by the success of the Tunisian 
revolution. Of course, while at the general level 
this coordination was spontaneous, the activist 
network was comprised not simply of individuals, 
but also of smaller, organized groups. These 
were informal democratic or human rights 
movements, democratic organizations or even 
youth wings of political parties.
pErspEctIvEs oF EgyptIan 
actIvIsts on thE rolE oF IntErnEt 
tools In thEIr rEvolutIons  
During the last 10 years, online tools have been 
used by pro-democracy movements in a variety 
of ways. During the April 6th protests, online tools 
were used to overcome geographical distance - 
Facebook was used to organize the committees 
of the movement in the different provinces in 
Egypt. The main Facebook group was an 
interface for the movement, where new people 
could learn more. Also, there were geographical 
Facebook groups for recruiting people in the 
provinces, and thematic groups such as media 
groups for publishing news, education groups 
for spreading ideas and strategies, as well 
as secret groups for discussions between the 
movement leaders in the different provinces 
and making strategic decisions without meeting 
physically or traveling.
Some of the activists mention protests that had 
been completely organized online – through 
Facebook groups, discussion boards and 
walls, wikis, blogs and other tools. They offer 
as an example one of the biggest campaigns 
– for the independence of the judiciary system 
– that took place in 2006. In some cases, the 
protest itself was the first time the activists who 
organized the event met offline.
The internet in Egypt has also been used 
for documenting events and violations. The 
above mentioned case of Khalid Said was, 
for example, one of the main reasons for the 
revolution in 2011. The official report on Khaled 
Said’s murder stated that he was a young drug 
addict who violently resisted the policemen 
and swallowed a hash packet that caused his 
death. Yet the details of this case had been 
uncovered by bloggers and new media activists 
who filmed testimonies of witnesses and then 
posted the videos online. This started the wide 
wave of anger and mobilization which resulted 
in a protest against police brutality on Egyptian 
Police Day (25th of January). 
The main purpose of the protest was a call to 
dismiss the Minister of Interior, and when many 
Egyptians acceded to the call, this turned into 
a protest against the whole regime. The internet 
has also been widely used for communication 
outside of Egypt, whether contacting and 
communicating with international media and 
journalists and other supporters, or even with 
Egyptians living abroad. This helped to obtain 
assistance in the form of financial support 
for democracy movements, advocating for 
democracy in Egypt internationally, and running 
and performing some online tasks and activities 
for the movements.
The regime had not initially felt threatened by 
the bloggers and online activists, and it had 
treated them as youth playing on the internet. 
It started taking the internet seriously only when 
the activists started organizing events on the 
ground and engaging more people. Over the 
years, activists that had been communicating 
online came to realize the importance of 
organizing their movement on the ground: to 
have local groups in the provinces, to hold 
meetings, conferences or marches in the streets, 
and to distribute more leaflets and stickers.
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thE usE oF thE nEw mEdIa  
By thE rEgImE
Almost all the activists that have been 
interviewed agree that the regime had not 
been able to communicate successfully through 
the new media and online tools. The regime 
never used internet tools on regular basis - as 
there was nothing to be said to the citizens, 
especially those present online. In the last few 
years before the revolution, some groups in 
the regime tried to build a media portrayal 
of regime change and pro-youth orientation. 
This was led by the son of president Hosni 
Mubarak, Gamal Mubarak, described in the 
state-owned traditional media as a leader of 
change. Despite the effort, this portrayal was 
not widely trusted by internet users.
However, the regime started using online 
platforms to attack the opposition. From the start 
of online activism until 2008, there were some 
minor attempts to counter the opposition on the 
internet. After 2008 and the beginning of more 
intensive use of Facebook to organize protest, 
the regime started to deal with the internet in 
a different way. The security forces allocated 
a security department for dealing with online 
activists5 and police officers received intensive 
trainings to do this6 – as a result, they succeeded 
many times in breaching activists’ privacy and 
in monitoring their online accounts. 
There are also accounts that the ruling party 
started to recruit and appoint people to use 
the internet on daily basis to monitor, counter, 
attack, and defame the opposition, opposition 
movements, and opposition figures. The 
opposition movements did not have the necessary 
level of organization to form a systemic strategy 
to counter these threats. Working publicly and 
exposing the contradictions in the regime’s 
statements and actions were the only tools the 
opposition had to oppose this.
5	On	May	7th	2008,	Ahmed	Maher,	the	head	of	the	April	
6	group,	was	kidnapped	by	the	state	security	and	he	was	
shown	by	them	a	department	for	police	officers	working	to	
counter	and	track	youth	online	activism	inside	the	Ministry	of	
Interior.
6	 It	remains	to	be	confirmed	who	provided	the	regime	with	
the	training.
rolE oF thE IntErnEt In rEcEnt 
polItIcal dEvElopmEnts
Most of the interviewed activists agree that 
we cannot exaggerate and describe what 
happened in Egypt in the last year as internet 
revolution, in spite of the great role the internet 
played in mobilizing people. The revolution 
was in their opinion inevitable, though without 
the internet it might have taken more time to 
happen. As one activist stated, “The reachable 
online population was the spark of the revolution 
for those who are not reachable offline.” 
However, it is important to remember that on 
the 28th of January - which was the main day 
of the protests – Egypt was totally offline, as the 
regime had disconnected the internet. 
The internet was one factor among many 
that sparked the eruption of the revolution in 
Egypt. It is clear to activists that the movement 
offline  preceded the movement online, and the 
movement online suffered when there was a 
wide gap between online and offline activism. 
Also, many argue that it was the poor people, 
those without internet access, who took the 
initiative in fighting the police troops blocking 
the way to El-Tahrir square and that they should 
take credit for opening the way to El-Tahrir 
square for the more internet-savvy activists. The 
use of new media and internet tools is generally 
perceived as a natural development, along 
the lines of the use of printing machines during 
the French Revolution or audio cassette tapes 
during the Iranian Revolution.
Initially, bloggers were acting as elites or 
intellectuals. With the use of Facebook, activists 
became more active offline, and conducted 
their activities in the streets. Bloggers and other 
activists using social media played two roles. 
One role was to spread the thoughts and ideas 
that created a general context for opposing 
Hosni Mubarak’s regime and refusing the 
succession of Gamal Mubarak. 
The second role was their use of the internet in 
creating a critical mass of activists that formed 
the solid core of the revolutionary movement that 
went to the streets among the huge masses of 
protesters on the 25th of January and convinced 
other people to join them. According to one 
activist, internet-savvy youth started and called 
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for acts of disobedience and protest – and then 
the rest of the people joined them. It is important 
to remember that the calls for the protests on the 
25th and 28th of January were initiated online.
Some try to exaggerate the role of online 
activists, and some try to overly downplay their 
role and to describe the revolution as that of 
solely the poor and marginalized. Both are 
wrong and ideologically driven. Young online 
activists started out several hundred strong and 
then became some hundreds of thousands - 
and they formed the core of the revolution that 
played out offline in the streets. This linkage 
was the missed factor over the years. 
The political elite were separate from the people 
in the streets, and the people in the streets were 
apathetic about political reform or change. This 
was summed up by one activist who stated 
that, “Our generation is that of the sons and 
daughters of the apathetic street men and 
women who linked the political opposition with 
the ordinary apathetic people and inaugurated 
the revolution.” 
onlInE communIcatIons and 
dEmocracy In BElarus
After the last presidential elections on December 
19, 2010, Belarus found itself in a deep political 
crisis. After the crackdown, almost a thousand 
protesters were detained and more than 40 
opposition leaders, together with some of the 
presidential candidates, were sentenced to 
years in prison. Political life was paralyzed and 
pro-democracy activists focused on supporting 
those who were in jail and their families, 
organizing solidarity campaigns. In the spring 
of 2011, the political crisis was aggravated by 
a severe currency and economic crisis, which 
significantly worsened the living conditions of a 
majority of the population and increased their 
dissatisfaction with the Belarusian authorities. 
But due to the high level of fear within 
Belarusian society, this discontent resulted 
neither in a revolution nor even in mass protests, 
as had happened in the late 1990s. This 
summer, Belarusians chose to participate in 
protest activities that cannot be attributed as 
oppositional or anti-governmental. Most of them 
were organized not by oppositional parties or 
movements, but by non-partisan activists and 
resembled flash-mobs rather then opposition 
rallies or demonstrations. All of these activities 
were announced and coordinated with the help 
of various social networks on the internet. 
rEgulatIons and rEstrIctIons 
oF IntErnEt usE 
Until 2010, only limited regulations applied 
to online activities, mainly covering retail 
e-shops. In February 2010, the President of 
the Republic of Belarus issued Decree No. 
60 On	 the	 Measures	 to	 Improve	 the	 Use	 of	
the	National	Segment	of	the	Internet	Network,	
which entered into force in July 2010, and was 
later supplemented by a number of subordinate 
acts.7 
The general idea of Decree No. 60 is to ensure 
that every user connected to the internet can be 
identified. According to the Decree, providers 
must identify every subscriber’s unit (ADSL/3G 
modem, mobile phone, etc.) and such unit must 
enable identification of the user (individual or a 
company). Identification must be ensured by the 
provider of internet services (personal ID must 
be provided by individuals, legal address and 
business name are required from companies). 
The use of proxies or anonymizers is not 
prohibited and there is no legal ground to block 
such services for private users. The owners 
of collective access points - including home 
networks not secured from external connections 
- also must provide for identification and 
recording of information about each session. 
During election days and opposition rallies (or 
during the so-called “silent protests” in 2011), 
Belarusian authorities blocked specific internet 
sites that provide independent information, 
namely online portals of independent mass 
media such as Charter	 ‘97,	 Radio	 Liberty,	
Belarusian	 partisan, and social networks like 
Livejournal, VKontakte and Facebook. During 
this year’s protests, Belarusian authorities also 
blocked social networks and major independent 
news media, amongst others. Although such a 
7	 See	report	“E-LAWS	IN	BELARUS”,	9	December	2010	
-	http://www.sorainen.com/UserFiles/File/Publications/
Belarusian-IT-Newsflash.December.2010-12-09.eng.pdf
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On the VKontakte social networking site 
(according to some sources, there are more 
than 2 million registered Belarusian users of this 
site) more than ten groups have been formed 
that focus on presidential elections. Users 
have registered most actively in the groups 
supporting opposition presidential candidates. 
At Facebook (about 150,000 Belarusians 
have accounts), the most famous group was 
formed by the public campaign “Human Rights 
Defenders for Free Elections”. Among the 
presidential candidates the most popular was 
the page of Andrei Sannikau (5,300 followers). 
Finally, the popular blogging site LiveJournal 
(more than 75,000 accounts in Belarus) has a 
number of politics related communities.
Despite the fairly large audience of social 
network users and the variety of social media 
that are available in Belarus, there is almost no 
debate – even within activist circles – about 
their possible use in the political process. The 
traditional opposition prefers the old ways of 
campaigning and rallies, and even considers 
the politicized internet community as competitors 
on the political field. The authorities, in their turn, 
tend to show online social media in a negative 
light. The First Belarusian TV Channel recently 
aired a documentary about the destructive 
nature of social networks, where it showed how 
foreign intelligence units organize revolutions 
in different countries using social networks. 
Examples given were those of Egypt and the 
riots in London.
rEcEnt protEsts – ElEctIons, 
stop-pEtrol, sIlEnt protEsts 
Since the presidential elections in 2010, the 
network activity of the Belarusian authorities’ 
opponents can be divided into two stages. 
The first one occurred between late December 
2010 and  February 2011 and in this phase 
social network activity was mainly focused on 
disseminating information about the events of 
December 19th in Minsk, attempts to expose 
the actions of the government to falsify elections 
and organize provocations during the protests, 
and raising money and organizing assistance 
to those arrested on December 19th-20th 
blockade was fairly easy to overcome with a 
use of  anonymizer,  it created a serious obstacle 
for those who used social networks via mobile 
phone during the protests. This in turn seriously 
limited information sharing and coordination on 
the field. For the time being the authorities do 
not block internet sites on a continuous basis. 
As an example of the regime’s activities, 
Belarusian security services tracked coordinators 
of the Revolution	 through	 the	 social	 network 
(RTSN) community, searched their homes and 
seized computers and data storages. The KGB 
tracked the activities of Dzmitry Niafiodau, who 
was one of the coordinators of the RTSN and 
conducted a search at his place, as well as 
that of Paulyukevich Siarhiej, the coordinator 
of another VKontakte community, who later 
admitted that the KGB forced him to sign an 
agreement on cooperation. This shows that 
Belarusian activists using social networks have 
very low levels of anonymity and that Belarusian 
secret services (namely the “K” department 
within the Ministry of Interior and the KGB) can 
effectively track protest groups’ organizers on 
the internet and prosecute them.
opposItIon and thE IntErnEt
After the presidential elections of 2006, when 
many of the popular independent websites had 
been blocked, information about events in the 
central square of the capital instantly spread 
through the popular internet social network site 
LiveJournal. In 2011, social networks have been 
used not only to monitor the electoral process 
or to exchange information not available in 
the official media, but they have additionally 
become a venue for political campaigning. 
The Belarusian opposition has  functioned 
for many years without access to the wide 
audience of the traditional media. The internet 
not only has given the opposition a platform for 
communication, but also has become a kind of 
testing space for ideas, since in social networks 
one discusses different issues, often with a 
neutral audience as well as with those who do 
not share one’s beliefs. 
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and their families. In the next phase, between 
April and July, activities were concentrated on 
the preparation and organization of peaceful 
protests within the campaigns “Stop-petrol” and 
“Revolution through social network”.
During the first stage, LiveJournal and Facebook 
were mainly used to disseminate information 
about the crackdown on election day, about 
the arrested and convicted activists and efforts 
to collect money for the victims of the repression. 
Coordinators of this solidarity movement were 
well-known Belarusian bloggers at LiveJournal. 
They also used Facebook to inform people 
about their activities. Coordination between 
the activists was maintained mainly by mobile 
phones, but the messaging features of Facebook, 
Google-Talk and Skype were used as well. The 
information went even further with the help 
of independent mass media and their online 
versions (Nasha	 Niva weekly, Charter’97, 
Naviny.by, Narodnaya	Volya, etc.).
The second phase started with the campaign 
“Stop petrol” in April 2011, organised in 
response to rising fuel costs in Belarus. Car 
owners dissatisfied with the rising prices 
blocked the central avenue of Minsk in October 
and  this action continues at the time of writing. 
Campaign information was distributed through 
the internet site of the organization (http://za-
avto.by) and independent media. News about 
preparations for the protests was spread through 
social networks, including Facebook, Vkontakte 
and Twitter. Feedback from the participants 
of these actions was received with the help 
of the these networks and e-mail, although 
coordination of participants during the actions 
was at a minimum level.
rEvolutIon through socIal 
nEtwork
The very name of the campaign says that its 
initiators intended to organize mass civil protest 
using social networking. In the Russian social 
network VKontakte, activists of the Movement 
of the Future created a community Revolution	
through	 social	 network (RTSN), which quickly 
became very popular among users. This is the 
VKontakte community which became the main 
platform for generating ideas, exchanging 
information and mobilization of participants 
for silent protest. The main purpose of this 
community and associated protests was change 
of the political regime in Belarus.
Organizers of the campaign have used, 
besides VKontakte, other social networks such 
as Facebook and Twitter, but as auxiliary tools. 
Thus, there was a feed channel organized from 
VKontakte to Twitter, but the main communication 
and selection of creative ideas took place in the 
VKontakte community. The organizers explain 
their choice of this social network with its 
popularity among Belarusian users (which they 
believe is higher than the popularity of the other 
social networks) and convenient tools for reposts 
and share of information. To communicate 
amongst themselves organizers use Skype and 
Google-talk in Belarus, and regular cell phones 
abroad. 
On the basis of the RTSN, the organizers of 
the protests maintained regular feedback 
from community members and protesters. The 
organizers set only the most general framework 
for the protests, and tactical details emerged 
from discussions within the community. 
The “silent protests” organized by the RTSN 
took place every Wednesday, in places where 
previously no one had organized public protests, 
and during the first month (June) attracted many 
people from all over Belarus. The Belarusian 
authorities did everything possible to stop 
the spread of protest activities. They blocked 
VKontakte and other social networks and some 
internet sites, and threatened potential protesters 
with the possible use of force and imprisonment. 
They also blocked the center of Minsk and 
central metro stations to prevent people from 
gathering. After the harsh counteractions from 
the riot police in Minsk and other cities and 
towns, the amount of protesters in the street on 
Wednesdays started to decrease and in August 
the organizers of the community announced a 
time-out for the street actions. According to one 
of the leaders of the silent protest campaign, 
Viachaslau Dyanau, the potential of mobilization 
through social networks is very high and so far 
has been only partially tapped into. 
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etc. Therefore, the demographics of protesters 
were limited to these social groups. For this 
reason, silent protests and other actions initiated 
online failed to attract workers of large industrial 
enterprises. According to some participants of 
the protests, a revolution in Belarus can only 
occur when workers of large Minsk plants (like 
the Minsk Tractor Works, Minsk Automobile 
Plant, etc.) join the street protests and strikes. 
Thus, silent protests and other actions inspired 
by social networks users had little impact on the 
society and on the political process in Belarus.
Finally, social media allow a number of 
Belarusian civil society activists to work from 
abroad, carrying out mobilization among 
internet users, while remaining inaccessible to 
the Belarusian secret services. Thus, political 
refugees do not feel excluded from political 
life and continue to communicate with their 
colleagues and friends and the general public.
To summarize, although this year in Belarus 
social networks have been one of the centers 
of protest activities, they do not have sufficient 
capacity to go beyond flash mobs or to 
organize mass protests which would have 
serious political consequences. Social media 
have limited access to certain categories of 
society which are very important for the success 
of such protests. It should also be recognized 
that social media can be an additional tool in 
the coordination of protest actions, but not the 
central one. 
A key role should be played by political 
organizations (political parties and movements) 
with a widespread network of activists and 
clear leadership. Social media without the 
support of the traditional opposition can be 
centers for the coordination of protests and can 
mobilize broad masses of people only if the 
central government is weakened and not ready 
to use violence against protesters. In Belarus, 
the incumbent power retains full control over the 
political situation in the country and is ready 
to actively resist any attempts of revolutionary 
change.
ImportancE oF socIal nEtworks 
In rEcEnt protEsts
During the 2011 protests internet technologies 
played a crucial role – more so than in the 
previous years. According to the coordinators 
and participants of these protests, mobilization 
and organization of the majority of protesters 
took place through social networks such as 
VKontakte, Facebook and Twitter. For the first 
time in the history of protest activity in Belarus, it 
was a social network that acted as an organizer 
of mass actions.
Under conditions where there is a state 
monopoly on electronic media in Belarus, 
independent newspapers have a very small 
circulation, platforms for public debate are 
almost non-existent and the political opposition 
is weak and divided, internet social networks 
and communities work as  platforms for 
discussion and the development of concepts for 
social action. The great achievement of social 
media during the protests in 2011, compared 
with previous years, was the mobilization of 
a new segment of the population that is not 
normally associated with the opposition and 
civil society organizations. Thus, the creators 
of the internet communities managed to go 
beyond the traditional “opposition ghetto” by 
organizing events like silent protests or flash-
mobs.
However, the use of social media to organize 
mass rallies in Belarus has had its drawbacks: 
for instance, some participants noted the very 
poor coordination in the field during protests, 
that there were no obvious organizers and 
leaders as there usually are during traditional 
opposition rallies. Since the authorities blocked 
access to social networks on the days of “silent 
protest” it was very difficult to coordinate 
activities through online tools, or to gather 
information. Journalists from the independent 
mass media played an important role, but their 
information in terms of speed of dissemination 
cannot be compared with the exchange of 
messages through social networks.
Another minus of social networks usage in 
organizing civil protests was the fact that the 
internet and social networks are used on a regular 
basis only by limited categories of people, 
e.g., office personnel, students, freelancers, 
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• The use of digital technologies by protesters 
and regimes has to be seen as a constant 
mutual challenge, in which protesters seek 
new ways to avoid the barriers and censorship 
enforced by the regime. One example of this is 
the use of telephones in Egypt for international 
communication, once the government had 
switched off the national internet.
• Both in Egypt and Belarus the cooperation 
of online activists and traditional forms of 
protest and organizations are seen as crucial 
to the success of the democratization process. 
Yet digital technologies do not offer a perfect 
solution in this regard. While in Egypt the activists 
have managed to build such connections and 
achieve a general coordination that led to the 
revolution of the 26th January, in Belarus online 
activities did to some extent mobilize a new 
demographic group, but other than that failed 
to spark broader protests. 
conclusIons
• Neither Egyptian nor Belarusian activists 
frame their recent protests as “internet 
revolutions.” At the same time, they clearly 
acknowledge the importance of digital tools 
for organization, mobilization and the spread 
of information. They emphasize that in order 
to be successful, online activities need to occur 
together with offline, mass protest.
• Both cases show that the use of digital 
technologies is a result of a longer  process, and 
forms and intensity of their use have developed 
over time. The ability to quickly mobilize is 
dependent on a longer history and experience 
with the use of digital tools for protest activities. 
• The use of digital technologies by social and 
protest movements depends on the general 
digital literacy of the society and the access 
to digital technologies. In particular, large user 
bases of social networking sites improve the 
effectiveness of the use of digital technologies 
for protest. 
• Digital technologies play an important role 
beyond that of immediate protest organization, 
in ways that might not be publicly visible - 
for example, by providing  communication 
space to protest leaders and key movement 
activists. Also, factors such as the ability to 
spread information or to mobilize broad bases 
of supporters, even if they do not participate 
in protest, are an important effect of online 
communication methods. 
• Digital technologies play also an important 
role in external communications, beyond the 
borders of a country - with supporters, the 
international media, or the diaspora for a given 
country, whose members are often involved 
remotely in pro-democracy activities.
• The same online technologies are used by the 
regime for the purpose of counter-revolutionary 
communication; and evidence provided by 
online content can pose risks for protesters 
who can be identified on their basis. Social 
networking sites used by protesters usually 
provide low levels of anonymity. These negative 
consequences need to be taken into account 
alongside the positive factors.
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